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EXHIBITS LIST

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS:
There was no hearing, so no reporter's transcript was taken.

Exhibits:
No exhibits were offered. The parties submitted briefs for consideration.

Additional Documents:
1.

Claimant's Opening Brief, filed February 23, 2015

2.

Defendant Employer/Surety's Responsive Brief, filed March 25, 2015

3.

Claimant's Reply Brief, filed March 30, 2015

4.

Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommendation, authored and signed by Referee
Brian Harper on April 1, 2015, but not adopted by the Commission

EXHIBITS LIST - KEITH MAYER 43468 - i

SEND ORIGINAL TO: lNDUST

COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O.

83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT 12-004576
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME Af..1D ADDRESS

CLAJMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Keith Mayer (deceased)
524 11th Street
Clarkston, Washington 99403

Michael Kessinger
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

TELEPHONE :NUMBER: (509) 758-9374
Telephone Number: 208.743.2313

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

(at time of injury)

TPC Holdings, Inc.
505 Capital Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
CLAIMANT'S

Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.
PO Box 7507
Boise, Idaho 83707
SECURITY NO.

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

CLAJMANT'S

02-10-2012
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE V/EEKLY WAGE

State of Idaho, County of Nez Perce

OF: $ 349.44

, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED)
Claimant caught a falling 20-foot ladder and fell to the ground, experiencing immediate low back pain.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Low back injury.
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME?
Claimant passed away of conditions unrelated to his workers' compensation injury. Claimant's spouse, Shirley Mayer, is entitled to disability in excess of impairment

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

[&] ORAL

D

D

WRITTEN

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED
1.

2.

Entitlement to disability in excess of impainnent;
Entitlement to attorney fees for an unreasonable denial of benefits.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS?

0

'~"""

YES

[&] NO IF §0,-PLEASE STATE ViHY:

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE Il~ ACCORDANCE WITH
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM J.C. 1002
ICJOOJ

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Complaint - Page 1 of 3

'SICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND
,ey Medical Center; 2315 8"' Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501
.. Joseph Regional Medical Center, PO Box 816, Lewiston, Idal10 83501
John M. McNulty, MD, 229 South 7"' Street, St. Maries, ldal10 83861
Peak Performance Physical Therapy, 1010 Bryden Ave, Ste. A, Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Kootenai Neurology Clinic, 2022 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Tri-State Memorial Hospital, 1221 Highland Avenue, Clarkston, Washington 99403
Clearwater Chiropractic, 3316 Y:, 4"' Street, Suite 4A, Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Lewiston Orthopaedic Associates, 320 Warner Drive, Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Clearwater Medical Clinic, 1522 17"' Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE?
To be ascertained
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ Unknown

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?$

[8J YES

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
DATE

D

NO

SIGNATURE OF CLAJMANT OR ATTORNEY

l

/

Unknown .

,e

-----·-

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS :MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

DATE OF DEATH

I

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?
DNo

DYES

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?
DYES

ONO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

2 7~ay

--"---'"""""<-¥-----'

2ofl I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

TPC Holdings, Inc.
505 Capital Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.
PO Box 7507
Boise, Idaho 83707

via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form J.C. 1003 with
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may he entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000.

(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0041

Patient Nam

Ke.Alii Ma yeJr>

Address: B2H
5-tarfSizJn
Phone Number: ~c>_~-p::_-~q,_:_-,Y' '
or Case Number:

b)ft 1tl:I03

(Provider Use Only)
Medical Record N u m b e r : - - - - - - - - o Pick up Copies
o Fax Copies# _ _
o Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by:

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby a u t h o r i z e - - - - - - - - - - - - to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:---------------------,--,---------------Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator! Self Insured Employer!/SIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

Purpose or need for d a t a : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (E.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:

D
D
D
D
D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:-------

D
Pathology
Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
D
Radiology Reports
D
Radiology Films
Consultation Reports
D
Operative Reports
Entire Record
Lab
Other: Specify _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable).
D
D
D

AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees,
officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of
the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My
signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding
disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above.

r/(L;ff;z.

Signature of Patient

m~~

Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act

Date

Signature of Witness

Date

Original: Medical Record

Copy: Patient

Complaint - Page

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 700 S.CLEARWATER LN, BOISE, IDAHO 83712

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
ALLEGED INJURY DATE: February 10, 2012

I. C. NO. 2012-004576
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Mr. Keith Mayer
524 11th Street
Clarkston, WA 99403

Mr. Michael T. Kessinger Esq.
Goicoechea Law Offices
PO Box287
Lewiston, ID 83501

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADORES

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

TPC Holdings, Inc.

Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.
P. 0. Box 7507
Boise, Idaho 83707

P.O. Box 957
Lewiston, ID 83501
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

Lea L. Kear
Law Offices of Kent W. Day
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

,,

The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint b}''tfniting:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating;:::
..

_X_

~

_/

IT IS: {Check One)
Admitted

Denied

X

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint acfually OCS):lffed on or about the time
claimed.

X

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

X

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
X

NA

NA

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly_ entirely_ by an accident arising out
of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the
trade, occupation, process, or employment.
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation
of such occupational disease.

X

NA

NA

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months after
the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.

X
X

8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho
Code, Section 72-419: $ 436.80
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Act.

10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? NONE
IC1003

I
Answer~-Page 1 of 2

(Continued from front
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.
A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein.
B. Whether Claimant's alleged injury is a result of an accident and injury pursuant to Idaho Code §72-102.
C. Whether Claimant's current condition is causally related to the 2/10/12 alleged accident or is a pre-existing or subsequent condition
D. Whether Claimant is entitled to (ADDITIONAL) indemnity benefits;
E. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees.
F. Whether Claimant's claim should be retained by the Commission beyond the statute of limitations.
G. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovery in this matter has only just begun.

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty=one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the
Complaint. A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their
attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately
the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been filed. Rule lll(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C. 1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

- - YES - - NO

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
No

Dated

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

PPD

TTD

Medical

$ 19,086.37 (PP!)

$20,862.07 (TTD)
$ 585.32 (TPD)

$ 31,315.92

PLEASE COMPLETE
I hereby certify that on the
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY:

Mr. Michael T. Kessinger Esq.
Goicoechea Law Offices
PO Box287
Lewiston, ID 83501
via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

-;:::7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

I

Mutual

Frorn:Liberty

01/

lnsu ranc

Oi/16/2016

From:Llba,r-ty Mutual tnsunance

~015

11:03

11:42

#029

#406

P.003/005

Lea L. Kear (lSB 9357)
Law Offices of Kent W. Day
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 895-2580
Fax (800) 972-3213
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)

Keith Mayer,
Claimant,
VS.

TPC Holdings, Inc.,

)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2012-004576

STIPULATED FACTS FOR HEARING

)
)

)
Employer,

)
}

and

)

Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp,

)
)
)
)

)

Surety,

_________

Defendants.
__:_.;..;._'--------- )

The parties agree to stipulate to the following facts:

1. On February 1O, 2012 Claimant Keith Mayer (hereafter Claimant) was an
employee of TPC Holdings Inc. (hereafter Employer) in Lewiston, Idaho. At said
time, TPC Holdings Inc. was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Worker's
Compensation Act by Liberty Northwes1 Insurance Corp. (hereafter Surety).

2. On or about February 10, 2012 Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject to
provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
3. Claimant suffered a compensable worker's compensation injury when he

strained his back while lifting a computer monitor.

Earlier the same day, he

1 - STIPULATED FACTS

0

20

THU

P.005/007

Fr<=>m:Llb erty

Frorn-:Ltb'Q rty

Mutual

lnsu ranc

Mutu0I lns.urmnca

01/2

01/16/2016

015

11:42

#02!.I

11:04

#406

P.006/007

P.004/005

grabbed a ladder to prevent it from fa!ling through a window and felt a twisting in

his back. Both events occurred in the course and scope of Claimant's
employmen t with Employer on February 10, 2012. Employer is the Lewiston

Tribune where Claimant worked as a maintenanc e worker.
4.

Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury
to his back.

5. On August 27, 2012 Dr. Dietrich performed a lumbar decompres sion and
decompression of the central canal lateral recess at neural foramina at l3, L4,
LS, and S1.

6. On November 8, 2012 Employer discharged Claimant.
7. Dr. Dietrich deemed Claimant MMI as of September 1, 2013.
8. On October 28, 2013 Dr. Goler performed an IME at surety's request. Dr. Galer
believed Claimant was medically stabre and could return to full time work at
least at the light or sedentary level with frequent positional changes and no
lifting over 50 pounds. Dr. Goler gave Claimant a 9% WPI.
9. On December 18, 2013 Dr. McNulty performed an IME at Claimant's request.
He diagnosed Claimant with: chronic low back pain status post multi-level
lumbar decompres sion; residual left S 1 radiculopathy; and spinal instability at

L5-S 1.

Dr. McNulty

Dr. McNulty recommend ed further diagnostic testing.

assigned a 14% WPI all attributable to the industrial injury. Dr. McNulty opined
that Claimant was only capable of performing sedentary work on a part-time
basis with no repetitive lifting and stooping and frequent positional changes. Dr.
McNulty did not believe Claimant could return to his time of Injury job.

2 - STIPULATE D FACTS

0

THU

1:

NO 5934

Frorn:Llberty

Fro m:LibEH" ty

Mutual

01/2

lnsura.nc

01/16/20i5

Mutual tnsurano e

_015

11:42

i1:04

#029

#406

P_OQ?/007

P _006/005

1o. Dr. Dietrich concurred by letter with Dr. McNulty's IME.

11.0n March 15, 2014 Ciaimant died of a heart attack, unrelated to the industrial
injury. Claimant was

on

He was 65 years ofd at the time

of his death.

12. Surety averaged the impairment awards given by Dr. McNulty and Dr. Golar.
Surety continued paying PPI after Claimant's death until the award of
$19,086.37 was paid in full. This award is equal to 52.5 weeks of benefits at
$363.55 per week.

DATED this ~/

5

r

~-------~-1 2ots
dayof eetoo ~
Law Offices of Kent W. Day

Lea L. Kear
Attorney for Defendants

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant

3- STIPULATED FACTS

O

THU 11:5
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KEITH MA YER,
Claimant,

IC 2012-004576

V.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSION OF LAW,
AND ORDER AND DISSENTING
OPINION

TPC HOLDINGS, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled
matter to Referee Brian Harper. In lieu of hearing, the parties submitted the issue for resolution
on a stipulation of facts and briefing. Claimant is represented by Michael Kessinger, Esquire, of
Lewiston. Defendants are represented by Lea Kear, Esquire, of Boise. The matter came under
advisement on March 31, 2015.

Referee Harper submitted proposed Findings of Fact,

Conclusion of Law and Recommendation for review and approval by the Commission pursuant
to Idaho Code § 72-506(2). This case raises an issue which, at first blush, promises to yield to
the clear language of an applicable statute. However, like many good problems, the closer one
looks at it, the less it seems to admit a simple answer.
In his proposed Decision, Referee Harper intimated that if unconstrained by pnor
decisions of the Commission, he might be persuaded by the arguments raised by Defendants in
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 1

support of their interpretation of the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431. However, Referee
Harper recognized that Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), is directly on point
and compels the conclusion that disability less than total which was unspecified and unknown at
the time of claimant's death survives the claimant's death from other causes. Accordingly,
Referee Harper made a recommendation to the Commission which is consistent with the
Commission's historic treatment of the issue in Martin. We agree with Referee Harper that the
issues raised by Defendants are interesting and worthy of further discussion, all with a view
towards ascertaining whether Martin was correctly decided. Therefore, we have chosen not to
adopt Referee Harper's

recommended

Findings of Fact,

Conclusion of Law and

Recommendation, even though we ultimately come to the same conclusion concerning the
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-4 31.
ISSUE

The sole issue to be decided is whether permanent partial disability in excess of
permanent partial impairment (PPI) survives the death of Claimant when such death is
unrelated to the industrial injury and Claimant dies before the existence and/or extent of
such disability is determined, but after Claimant reached maximum medical improvement
(MMI) and was assigned a PPI rating.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing
supplied by the parties.
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

On February 10, 2012, Claimant suffered a compensable industrial accident.

Following treatment, Claimant was declared medically stable as of September 1, 2013. On
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 2

October 28, 2013, Dr. Goler performed an IME at Surety's request. He gave Claimant a 9% PPI
rating.
2.

On December 18, 2013, Dr. McNulty performed an IME at Claimant's request.

He eventually assigned Claimant a 14% PPI rating. Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Dietrich,
concurred with Dr. McNulty' s 14% PPI rating. Surety averaged the impairment awards given by
Dr. McNulty and Dr. Goler and commenced payment at the statutory rate.
3.

On March 15, 2014, Claimant died from causes unrelated to the subject accident.

4.

Following Claimant's death, Surety continued to pay PPI benefits until the full

averaged rating, equaling $19,086.37, was paid. This award equates to 52.5 weeks of benefits at
$363.55 per week, or 55% of the average state wage at Claimant's year of injury.
DISCUSSION

I
5.

The parties evidently concede that should Claimant be found to be totally and

permanently disabled as a consequence of the subject accident, Surety's obligation to pay such
total and permanent disability benefits ends with Claimant's death, and such benefits are in no
wise inheritable. The issue before the Commission is whether, under Idaho Code § 72-431, a
similar rule obtains in the event that Claimant is found to be less than totally and permanently
disabled as a result of the subject accident. Claimant contends that the provisions of Idaho Code

§ 72-431 clearly anticipate that an award of permanent disability less than total, made either
before or after Claimant's death, is inheritable, while Defendants contend that the survival of
both permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits are barred by the provisions of the
statute.
Idaho Code § 72-431 provides:
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 3

When an employee who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or
unscheduled permanent disability less than total, and who has filed a valid claim
in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the injury or occupational disease
before the expiration of the compensable period specified, the income benefits
specified and unpaid at the employee's death, whether or not accrued or due at the
time of his death, shall be paid, under an award made before or after such death,
to and for the benefit of the persons within the classes at the time of death and in
the proportions and upon the conditions specified in this subsection and in the
order named:
(1) To the dependent widow or widower, if there is no child under the age of
eighteen (18) or child incapable of self-support; or
(2) If there are both such a widow or widower and such a child or children,
one-half (1/2) to such widow or widower and the other one-half (1/2) to such
child or children; or
(3) lfthere is no widow or widower but such a child or children, then to such
child or children; or
(4) If there is no survivor in the above classes, then to the personal
representative of the decedent.
The statute is a product of the comprehensive 1971 recodification of the Idaho workers'
compensation laws, and has no antecedent in the prior statutory scheme.

It seems

straightforward enough, specifying that if an injured worker dies from causes unrelated to his
accident or occupational disease, his survivors will be able to recover disability benefits payable
to claimant if he is deemed to be less than totally and permanently disabled. Implicitly, this rule
does not apply where claimant is found to be totally and permanently disabled. This is exactly
the interpretation applied by the Commission in Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367
(1988).

In Martin, claimant suffered a compensable work-related injury.

At some point

following her injury, she was given a PPI rating by a physician. However, the parties never
came to agreement concerning the extent of Martin's entitlement to a PPI award prior to her
death from an unrelated cause. Nor was there any agreement between the parties as to the extent
and degree of Martin's disability in excess of physical impairment prior to her death. The issue
before the Commission was whether Martin's claim for permanent partial disability benefits
survived her death. Defendants did not argue that a claim for disability over impairment is
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generally barred by the statute. Rather, they argued that since Martin's claim for permanent
partial disability had not been adjudicated at the time of her death and no award had been
entered, the claim was "unspecified" as that term is used in the statute. Rejecting this argument,
and concluding that the claim for permanent partial disability benefits survived Martin, the
Commission stated:
The extent of a claimant's permanent partial disability is never finally determined
until there is an award of the Commission following an evidentiary hearing or
unless the parties have reached an agreement with regard to such permanent
partial disability, reduced the agreement to writing and had the agreement
approved by the Commission. Such approved agreement also constitutes an
award of the Commission. We note that Sec. 72-431 specifically empowers the
Commission to make an award both before and after the death of the claimant.
We therefore conclude that 72-431 does not require that the extent of a claimant's
permanent partial disability be specified by an award prior to the death of the
claimant in order for the income benefits to survive the death of the claimant and
be distributed to survivors. The reference in the statute to "the income benefits
specified and unpaid at the employee's death" does not necessarily require that
the benefits be specified by award prior to the death of the claimant. The
Commission, may following the death of the claimant, conduct an evidentiary
hearing and make an award and therein specify the income benefits due for
permanent partial disability which were unpaid at the employee's death, and in
the award distribute such benefits as may be determined to the named survivors.
We therefore conclude that all permanent partial disability benefits, including
disability from medical impairment as well as nonmedical factors, may be
determined by the Commission subsequent to the death of the employee from
unrelated causes and may then be awarded by the Commission to the classes
specified in Section 72-431.
Therefore, a claim for permanent partial disability benefits survives the claimant's death even
though claimant's entitlement to such an award was not adjudicated prior to death.
6.

Martin seems to make it clear that the fact that Claimant's entitlement to

disability less than total was not adjudicated or otherwise resolved prior to his death is not an
impediment to the survival of a claim for disability less than total. Martin did not specifically
address the somewhat different issue before the Commission in this case, i.e. whether claims for
permanent partial disability as well as claims for total and permanent disability are barred by the
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provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431. Again, a cursory reading of the statute seems to indicate that
if permanent disability is less than total, then it has the potential to survive the death of the
injured worker while disability that is total and permanent does not.
7.

In addition to adopting Idaho Code § 72-431 as part of the 1971 recodification,

the legislature also adopted, for the first time, definitions of impairment and disability.
Permanent impairment is defined at Idaho Code § 72-422 as follows:
"Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after
maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnormality or loss,
medically, is considered stable or nonprogressive at the time of evaluation.
Permanent impairment is a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent
disability, and is a contributing factor to, but not necessarily an indication of, the
entire extent of permanent disability.
Permanent disability is defined at Idaho Code§ 72-423 as follows:
"Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability' results when the actual
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of
permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be
reasonably expected.
Under Idaho Code § 72-424, the evaluation of permanent impairment envisions a "medical
appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured employee's
personal efficiency in the activities of daily living ... ". Under Idaho Code § 72-425, permanent
disability is evaluated by considering "the injured employee's present and probable future ability
to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and
by pertinent nonrnedical factors as provided in Section 72-430, Idaho Code."

Case law

construing these sections makes it clear that an injured worker's permanent impairment is but
one component to be considered by the Commission in assessing such worker's permanent
disability; a disability rating may exceed the claimant's impairment rating. Baldner v. Bennett's,
Inc., 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2 1214 (1982). So far, the statutory scheme seems to recognize a
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distinction between the concepts of permanent impairment and permanent disability. If these
statutory definitions of impairment and disability are applied to the provisions of Idaho Code
§ 72-4 31, it is easy to appreciate why the statute can be interpreted to mean that an award of less

than total and permanent disability does survive the death of the injured worker while an award
of total and permanent disability does not. The statute specifically states that the income benefits
owed to "an employee who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled
permanent disability less than total" shall be payable to the injured worker's survivors.

If

"disability" is a term of art, then it seems clear that what was intended is that permanent partial
disability benefits are inheritable while total and permanent disability benefits are not.
8.

However, though portions of the statutory scheme draw distinctions between what

is meant by "impairment" and "disability", in other portions there is an unfortunate intermingling
of the terms which confuses the resolution of the issue before the Commission. To begin, what
exactly is meant by this language from Idaho Code § 72-431; "When an employee who has
sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled permanent disability less than
total ... "? If, as Claimant argues, the purpose of the statute is to make permanent partial
disability inheritable, but not total and permanent disability, why doesn't the statute simply say,
"When an employee who has sustained disability less than total ... "? What is this business about
"scheduled and unscheduled permanent disability less than total ... "?
9.

To understand what is meant by "scheduled and unscheduled disabilities less than

total", reference must be made to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code
§ 72-429.

10.

Idaho Code § 72-428 provides for the payment of certain scheduled benefits for

total and partial losses of members of the body. The statute specifies in pertinent part:
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An employee who suffers a permanent disability less than total and permanent
shall, in addition to the income benefits payable during the period of recovery, be
paid income benefits for such permanent disability in an amount equal to fiftyfive percent (55%) of the average weekly state wage stated against the following
scheduled permanent impairments respectively:
There follows a specific indemnity schedule for total losses of body parts, and the number of
weekly payments to be made as specific indemnity for such loss.

Idaho Code § 72-428(5)

recognizes that the injury to a specific body part may result in a partial as well as a total loss.
That subsection provides:
Partial loss or partial loss of use. Income benefits payable for permanent partial
disability attributable to permanent partial loss or loss of use, of a member shall
be not less than for a period as the permanent impairment attributable to the
partial loss or loss of use of the member bears to total loss of the member.
Therefore, for the partial loss of a body part, the injured worker shall be paid a sum based on the
relationship the partial loss of the body part bears to the total loss of the body part.
11.

There are several things that are notable about the provisions of Idaho Code §

72-428. First, the specific indemnities recognized in that section are payable only in cases of
disability less than total; a totally and permanently disabled worker is not entitled to the
payments specified in this section.

Second, the benefits payable pursuant to Idaho Code §

72-428 are payable in addition to whatever income benefits the injured worker was entitled to
while in a period of recovery. In other words, the payment of Idaho Code § 72-428 benefits
arises independent of any temporary disability from work. Third, the benefits payable pursuant
to the statute, though characterized as payments for "permanent disability" are to be paid in an
amount equal to 55% of the average weekly state wage stated against the "schedule of permanent
impairments" listed in the body of the statute. Therefore, the specific indemnities identified for
partial and total loss of body parts represent benefits for what can only be characterized as
"permanent impairments". In short, what is clearly anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-428 is that if
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 8

an injured worker is less than totally and permanently disabled, he is entitled to receive the
payment of permanent impairment for total or partial loss of the body parts referenced in the
statute. It is unclear why the statute specifies income benefits paid pursuant to the statute are for
"permanent disability" when the payments are intended for what can only be described as
"permanent impairment".
12.

Of course, Idaho Code § 72-428 does not capture the umverse of potential

permanent impairments that might befall an injured worker. Unscheduled permanent disabilities
not included in the schedule of benefits enumerated in Idaho Code § 72-428 are dealt with in
Idaho Code§ 72-429. That section provides:
In all other cases of permanent disabilities less than total not included in the
foregoing schedule the amount of income benefits shall be not less than the
evaluation in relation to the percentages of loss of the members, or of loss of the
whole man, stated against the scheduled permanent impairments, as the
disabilities bear to those produced by the permanent impairments named in the
schedule. Weekly income benefits paid pursuant to this section shall likewise be
paid at fifty-five percent (55%) of the average weekly state wage for the year of
the injury as provided in section 72-428, Idaho Code.
The statute, particularly the first run-on sentence, is hardly a model of clarity, and has left at least
one commentator scratching his head about what exactly the legislature intended. See MIKE
WETHERELL, THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW OF IDAHO

277 (4th ed. 1989). As with Idaho

Code § 72-428, the statute is only intended to apply in less than total cases and is also clearly
intended to treat those "disabilities" which are not included in the schedule of specific indemnity
contained therein. In such cases, the income benefits payable to the injured worker for such
"permanent disabilities" shall be "not less than the evaluation in relation to the percentages of
loss of the members, or loss of the whole man, stated against the scheduled permanent
impairments, as disabilities bear to those produced by the permanent impairments named in the
schedule." It is difficult to understand what is intended by this language. It may mean that the
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amount payable for an unscheduled impairment shall bear the same relation to the amount
payable for a scheduled impairment as the severity of the unscheduled injury bears to the
severity of a scheduled injury. It may mean something else. Possibly, it has something to do
with how "permanent disability," as defined at Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430 is
to be calculated and paid.

Possibly, it is only concerned with the calculation of what we

typically think of as unscheduled "permanent impairment" as defined by Idaho Code § 72-422.
13.

It is important to understand whether Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code

§ 72-429 deal only with the payment of "permanent impairment" versus "permanent
impairment" and "permanent disability", because of the language of Idaho Code § 72-431:
"When an employee who has sustained a disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled
permanent disability less than total ... ". If Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 are
intended only to specify the manner in which awards of permanent impairment are made, then
Idaho Code § 72-431 would only seem to endorse the proposition that entitlement to PPI benefits
(which are only payable in less than total cases) survive the death of the injured worker,
notwithstanding that the statute refers to scheduled or unscheduled "permanent disability". Said
slightly differently, it is clear that Idaho Code § 72-431 references scheduled and unscheduled
benefits to which a claimant may be entitled under Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code
§ 72-429. If those statutes only treat the award of permanent impairment, despite the fact that
those statutes freely use the term "disability", then it would seem that Idaho Code § 72-431 was
only intended to treat the survival of what we conventionally refer to as a PPI award.
14.

Although Idaho Code § 72-431 has no antecedent in prior law, the current Idaho

Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429 do have antecedents in the prior statutory scheme, and a
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review of prior Idaho Supreme Court cases treating those earlier statutes may shed some light on
the legislative intent in adopting Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429.

15.

Prior to the 1971 recodi:fication, the concepts captured in the current Idaho Code

§ 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 were captured in one statute, the former Idaho Code
§ 72-313. There were a number of iterations of that statute over the years, but immediately prior
to the 1971 recodi:fication, it read as follows:
SPECIFIC INDEMNITIES FOR CERTAIN INJURIES. (a) Specific Indemnity
for Permanent Injury. An employee, who suffers a permanent injury less that
total, shall, in addition to compensation, if any, for temporary total and temporary
partial disability, be entitled to specific indemnity for such permanent injury equal
to 60% of his average weekly wages, but not more than $43.00 nor less than
$26.00 per week for the periods of time stated against the following scheduled
injuries respectively:
SPECIFIC INDEMNITY SCHEDULE

For loss of one:

For the following
Number of weeks:

Arn1 at or near shoulder ..................................................................................... 240
At elbow ....................................................................................................... 220
Between wrist and elbow ............................................................................. 210
Hand ............................................................................................................. 200
Thumb and Metacarpal bone thereof ................................................................... 70
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 40
At second or distal joint ................................................................................. 30
Index finger and Metacarpal bone thereof ........................................................... 40
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 35
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 20
At distal joint. ................................................................................................. 10
Middle finger and metacarpal bone thereof.. ....................................................... 40
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 30
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 18
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 8
Ring Finger and metacarpal bone thereof............................................................ 30
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 20
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 10
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 5
Little finger and metacarpal bone thereof ............................................................ 20
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 15
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 10
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At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 5
Leg at or so near hip joint as to preclude use of artificial limb ......................... 180
At or above knee where stump remains sufficient to permit use of
artificial limb ................................................................................................ 150
Between knee and ankle ............................................................................... 140
Foot at ankle ................................................................................................. 125
Great toe with metatarsal bone thereof. ............................................................... 30
At proximal joint. ........................................................................................... 15
At second or distal joint ................................................................................. 10
Toe other than great toe with metatarsal bone thereof.. ....................................... 12
At proximal joint. ............................................................................................. 6
At second joint ................................................................................................. 3
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 3
Eye by enucleation ............................................................................................. 140
Total blindness of one eye ........................................................................... 120
Ear, total deafness of one ..................................................................................... 35
Total deafness of second ear ........................................................................ 115
(b) Computation of Specific Indemnity for Non-scheduled Injuries. In all other
cases of permanent injury, less than total, not included in the above schedule, the
compensation shall bear such relation to the periods stated in the above schedule
as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule or
to total disability (400 weeks).
(c) Specific Indemnity. -Computation of Minor's Wages. In case of a minor,
under 18 years of age, receiving less weekly wages than paid to regular adult
workmen employed in the same community or vicinity in the class of labor in
which such minor was employed, the compensation provided for under this
section shall be computed upon the basis of the wages received by such regular
adult workmen.
Idaho Code § 72-313. (1967).
Comparing this provision to the current statutory scheme reveals that the former Idaho Code
§ 72-313(a) bears a strong resemblance to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428, while Idaho
Code § 72-313(b) similarly resembles the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-429. Basically, the
former Idaho Code § 72-313(b) anticipates that the compensation payable for unscheduled
injuries shall bear the same relationship to the compensation payable for scheduled injuries as the
severity of the unscheduled injury bears to the severity of the scheduled injuries. This language
demonstrates that what was being treated in the fom1er Idaho Code§ 72-313(b) was payment of
indemnity for bodily injury, i.e., what we would now call "permanent impairment".
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16.

At the time Idaho Code § 72-313 was in effect, the statutory scheme did not

contain a provision similar to Idaho Code § 72-431. However, the issue of the inheritability of
workers' compensation benefits was treated by the Court on several occasions over the decades,
and Idaho Code§ 72-313 figures prominently in the treatment of that issue. As developed infra,
those cases strongly suggest that under the former, but similar, statute, only what we now call
"permanent impairment" was intended to be inheritable by an injured worker's survivors.
17.

In Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 Idaho 450, 254 P. 212 (1927), Haugse

suffered the loss of an eye as the result of a work-related accident. The workers' compensation
surety entered into an agreement with Haugse to pay him $1,920, at the rate at $16.00 per week
for 120 weeks as compensation for loss of the eye.

This agreement was approved by the

Industrial Commission, and payments were made thereon by surety until Haugse died from
causes unrelated to the subject accident. Thereafter, surety asked that it be relieved from the
obligation to pay the balance of the award. Surety appealed from an order of the district court
requiring it to continue the payments. On appeal, surety argued that it is a policy of workers'
compensation that injured workers receive benefits only during periods of incapacity for work,
and that on termination of such incapacity (e.g., death), compensation should cease. The Court
ruled, however, that these general principles did not apply to the specific injuries suffered by
claimant. The applicable statute provided:
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be fifty-five per
centum of the average weekly wages, but not more than the weekly compensation
provided in section 6231, in addition to all other compensation, for the periods
stated against such injuries respectively, to wit: * * * One eye by enucleation, 120
[weeks]. * * *"
Therefore, unlike other workers' compensation benefits, the requirement to pay a scheduled
benefit for the loss of an eye was unconditional, and required in addition to all other
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compensation.

Distinguishing between such a scheduled benefit, and other workers'

compensation benefits, the Court stated:
There is nothing in C. S. § 6234, or in the entire act, providing for a cessation of
payments, for the loss of an eye by enucleation, on the death of the injured person.
By its approval of the agreement the board awarded the workman $1,920. The
award was in accordance with the statute, and was unconditional; it was not made
to depend on a continuation of incapacity, or whether the workman lived
throughout the life of the agreement; and the casualty company was not released
from its obligation by the death of the injured workman.
The scheduled benefits payable for the loss of an eye did not depend on Haugse's incapacity
from work. Therefore, surety was not released from its obligation by Haugse's death.
18.

In Mahoney v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927 (1943), one Linder

suffered bilateral upper extremity injuries as a consequence of a work-related accident. While
still receiving treatment for his left upper extremity injuries Linder died from causes unrelated to
the work accident. Surety contended that it did not have responsibility to continue paying the
award following Linder's death. The Court disagreed, stating that the award to Linder was in the
nature of liquidated damages and not compensation for disability which otherwise might cease
with his death. As the Court explained:
In other words, the award to survive must have been an award to the employee
and the right thereto, though not determined, fixed at the time of the accident and
before his death. If the award is not under the special schedule, the authorities
almost uniformly hold it does not survive; therefore, the dependents could make
no claim.
Therefore, there is a distinction to be drawn between benefits payable under a "special schedule",
and other workers' compensation benefits, such as compensation for disability.
19.

That such a distinction exists is made clear by Peterson v. JR. Simplot Co., 83

Idaho 120, 358 P.2d 587 (1961). Peterson suffered a severe right upper extremity injury as the
result of a work-related accident. He died from causes umelated to his work accident before he
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had reached stability from his work-related injuries. Therefore, the extent of Peterson's residual
permanent injury attributable to the work accident had not been determined as of the date of his
death. Surety petitioned the Commission for permission to close its file without payment of a
specific indemnity for Peterson's injury. The Industrial Accident Board declined to do so, and
instead retained jurisdiction to determine the extent and degree of Peterson's entitlement to
recovery for a permanent injury. The employer appealed this order. The Court had before it the
provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313, set forth above, noting that compensation for permanent
injury less than total was governed by that statute. However, from the evidence it was clear that
Peterson's injury did not fall within one of the specific scheduled injuries identified at Idaho
Code § 72-313(a).

Rather, Peterson's upper extremity injury constituted one of the

"nonscheduled" injuries referenced at Idaho Code § 72-313(b). The question before the Court
was whether a claim for permanent partial disability survives the death of an injured employee if
the death is unrelated to the industrial accident and if the claim is based on a nonscheduled
injury. Citing Mahoney, supra, the Court first ruled that a claim for specific indemnity for
permanent injury survives though the cause of the injured worker's death is unrelated to the
industrial accident.
20.

Concerning indemnity for nonscheduled injuries, the Court noted that prior to

193 7 there was no provision to pay indemnity benefits for injuries other than those identified in
the specific indemnity schedule. However, in 193 7, the predecessor to Idaho Code § 72-313 was
amended to provide a method of computation of specific indemnity for all permanent injuries
less than total which are recognized as specific and comparable losses of the named body parts.
Thereafter, all such losses, both scheduled and unscheduled, constituted permanent injuries
within the purview of the specific indemnity schedule as set forth at Idaho Code § 72-313. This
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strongly suggests that the immediate predecessor to the current Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho
Code § 72-429 recognized that benefits payable for unscheduled indemnities were for permanent
impairment and not permanent disability over and above impairment. This is reinforced by the
following observation of the Court:
Survivability of a claim for specific indemnity for permanent injury is grounded
upon actual or comparable loss or physical impairment, and not upon loss of
earning power or capacity to work. This aspect of the workmen's compensation
law is recognized.
From this language, it could not be any plainer that the provisions of the former Idaho Code
§ 72-313 provided for the payment of scheduled and nonscheduled impairments, and that only
such impairments (and not disability for loss of earning capacity) survive the death of an injured
worker.
21.

Hix v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 88 Idaho 155, 397 P.2d 237 (1964) is not a death

case, but it does construe the former Idaho Code § 72-313. Hix suffered work-related injuries for
which he was rated by a number of physicians.

The Industrial Accident Board eventually

averaged these ratings, awarding Hix 76.5% of the whole man (400 weeks), or 306 weeks of
compensation at $30 per week. Hix did not quarrel with the 76.5% rating, but contended that it
should have been paid to him against the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-31 O(a), which provided
for the payment of benefits for total and permanent disability for work. Hix reasoned that if he
had suffered total and permanent disability, he would have been entitled to the payment of 1,836
weeks of benefits based on his life expectancy of 43 years. Hix argued that he should have been
paid 76.5% of the benefits that he would have received for this period had he been found to be
totally and permanently disabled.

The Court rejected this argument, but also rejected the

calculation utilized by the Commission to compensate claimant for his injury. Rather, the Court
concluded that claimant's less than total disability could only be compensated under the
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provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313. The Court's treatment of Idaho Code § 72-313 makes it
clear that the only benefits payable under that statute were for what we now describe as
permanent impairment:
This Court has considered the meaning and application of LC. § 72-313, which
evaluates the various bodily members where actual loss is occasioned, such as an
arm, leg, eye, etc. In other cases of permanent injury not included in the schedule
compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the schedule as the
disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries stated in the schedule. This
latter provision of LC. § 72-313, requiring nonscheduled permanent injuries to be
evaluated by comparison to the listed permanent injuries, was effected in 193 7 by
an amendment, Idaho Sess. Laws 193 7, ch. 241. Prior to that amendment, nonscheduled permanent injuries, unless they could be included in the listed classes
of permanent injuries, could not be evaluated in terms of comparative loss of
bodily members, and no compensation could be allowed therefor. See Barry v.
Peterson Motor Co., 55 Idaho 702, 46 P.2d 77 (1935), again indicative that
recovery under the workmen's compensation law must be by virtue of legislative
fiat, and not otherwise.
In determining specific indemnities payable for permanent injuries listed and
referred to in LC. § 72-313, disability for work, loss of earning power, or capacity
to work are not factors to be considered. See Kelly v. Prouty, 54 Idaho 225, 245,
30 P.2d 769, 777 (1934), wherein it is stated;

'* * * The Compensation Law also provides for specific
indemnities for certain injuries, as set forth in section 43-1113
[now LC. § 72-313], when disability for work by reason of the loss
of the various members of the body, enumerated is not to be taken
in consideration. [Citation.] But the general theory and spirit of
the act, except for the specific indemnities set forth in section
43-1113, is to the effect that compensation is provided to make
good the loss of the earning power or capacity to work on account
of the injury. * * * in determining those specific indemnities, the
loss of earning power or capacity to work is not to be considered. *
* *'
(Emphasis supplied.)
Hix went on to argue that even under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313, some provision
should be made for the payment of disability above and beyond the specific indemnities
identified in the statute. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that in cases of less than total
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and permanent disability, claimant's entitlement to compensation must be evaluated under the
specific loss or comparative loss of body parts referenced in Idaho Code § 72-313, and not
otherwise.
22.

One other case is worth discussing before leaving the former Idaho Code

§ 72-313. Estate of Martin v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 499 P.2d 569 (1972), though decided in
June of 1972, involved interpretation of the former Idaho Code § 72-313.

Martin received

multiple injuries to his head, right upper extremity and torso as the result of an accident at a
lumber mill. He was still receiving treatment for these severe injuries when he met his death on
a hunting trip.

Following proceedings on unrelated matters, Martin's widow petitioned the

Industrial Accident Board, seeking an award of benefits based on specific indemnities for
Martin's injuries and for an award of temporary total disability benefits and attorney's fees.
23.

The Board found that Martin's specific indemnities "combined to constitute a

total and permanent disability." The Board concluded that Martin was totally and permanently
disabled, and that such total and permanent disability did not survive to the estate. Only in the
event of a specific indemnity loss or comparative rating based upon a specific indemnity loss less
than total can such an indemnity survive the death of the injured worker.

Martin's estate

appealed. The Supreme Court identified the principal issue as follows:
The underlying problem facing appellant in this appeal is the fact that this Court
has held that claims for specific indemnity for permanent injuries survive the
death of the claimant (Peterson's Estate v. J. R. Simplot Co., 83 Idaho 120, 358
P.2d 587 (1961)), but there is no holding by this Court that benefits for total
permanent disability survive the death of the injured workman.

Martin Estate v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 874, 499 P.2d 569, 573 (1972).
The Court ruled that it found no legislative authority for the proposition that claims for total and
permanent disability survive the death of the employee. In reaching this conclusion, it relied, in
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part, on Peterson's Estate v. JR. Simplot Co., supra. It cited that case for the proposition that
while claims for specific indemnity for permanent injury survive the death of the injured worker,
benefits payable for loss of earning power or capacity to work do not. Since an award of total
and permanent disability is intended to compensate the injured worker for loss of earning power
or capacity, such an award cannot, therefore, survive the death of the injured worker.
24.

What is left undiscussed in Martin is whether a claim for disability over and

above impairment, but less than total, is likewise not inheritable. However, the rationale of the
Court's decision limiting the survival of benefits to the specific indemnities identified in Idaho
Code § 72-313 applies with equal weight to disability benefits payable to an injured worker over
and above permanent impairment which are also intended to compensate him for loss of earning
power and capacity in the less than total case.
25.

From a review of the former Idaho Code § 72-313 it can be concluded that it dealt

with the payment of specific indemnities, both scheduled and unscheduled, for damage to, or loss
of, parts of the body, i.e., what we would now treat as the payment of "permanent impairment".
With this understanding of the former statute, the question becomes whether something other
than the calculation of what is generally regarded as "permanent impairment" is contemplated by
the provisions of the current Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429.
26.

Under Idaho Code § 72-428, an injured worker who has suffered anatomic loss

recognized by that section shall be paid permanent disability less than total at 55% of the average
weekly wage against the scheduled permanent impairments itemized in that section. Although
the indemnity payable is clearly intended to compensate the injured worker for partial or total
loss of use of a body member, the statute nevertheless characterizes these payments as payments
for "permanent disability" less than total.

It is puzzling and confusing that the statute
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characterizes what we typically think of as the payment of "permanent impairment" as
"permanent disability". We surmise that this is simply a recognition of the fact that permanent
impairment is a component of permanent disability. Idaho Code § 72-422 provides in pertinent
part:
... Permanent impairment is a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent
disability, and is a contributing factor to, but not necessarily an indication of, the
entire extent of permanent disability.
27.

Idaho Code§ 72-429 is more difficult to parse. Again, if the statute describes the

method to compute both unscheduled "permanent impairment" and "permanent disability", i.e.
disability over impairment but less than total, then Idaho Code § 72-431 must be construed to
endorse the survival of claims for less than total disability over and above impairment, but not
for total and permanent disability. On the other hand, if Idaho Code § 72-429 does nothing more
than describe the method of computing the value which attaches to unscheduled anatomic injury,
then PPI is the only benefit that survives the death of a worker from causes unconnected to the
work accident.
28.

Comparing the former Idaho Code§ 72-313(b) to Idaho Code§ 72-429 reveals

certain fundamental similarities. Both statutes address a method by which certain unscheduled
indemnity benefits may be calculated by reference to the scheduled benefits identified at Idaho
Code § 72-428.

Although Idaho Code § 72-429 addresses the calculation of unscheduled

"permanent disability" less than total while Idaho Code § 72-313(b) speaks to the calculation of
unscheduled "permanent injury", both statutes use a similar formula to calculate the value of the
unscheduled indemnity and both base that calculation on a comparison to the list of scheduled
benefits for anatomic injury referenced at Idaho Code§ 72-428. To paraphrase, under the former
Idaho Code § 72-313(b), for an unscheduled injury, the number of weeks of indemnity payable
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for that injury is to the specific indemnities identified in the schedule as the severity of the
unscheduled injury is to the severity of those identified in the schedule. The first sentence of
Idaho Code § 72-429 seems to anticipate that for injuries not included in the Idaho Code

§ 72-428 schedule, the percentage of loss for such injury is to the scheduled indemnities as the
severity of the injury in question is to the severity of the scheduled impairments. Arguably, like
Idaho Code § 72-313(b), the current Idaho Code § 72-429 only addresses the calculation of what
we generally understand to be unscheduled "permanent impairment". However, as developed
above, we are mindful that as part of the 1971 recodification, Idaho adopted statutory provisions
which define and distinguish the terms "permanent disability" and "permanent impairment".
Since "permanent disability" is specifically defined at Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code

§ 72-430, we believe that the use of this term in Idaho Code § 72-429 cannot be disregarded.
Idaho Code § 72-422 recognizes that "permanent impairment" is a component of "permanent
disability". For permanent disability less than total, Idaho Code § 72-428 recognizes that one of
the components of permanent disability is payment for anatomic injury based on the schedule set
forth in that statute.

For all other "permanent disabilities" less than total, Idaho Code § 72-429

specifies that the amount payable for such permanent disability shall be calculated as a
percentage of the loss of a bodily member or the loss of the whole man in an amount that reflects
the severity of the disability as compared to the scheduled impairments set forth at Idaho Code
§ 72-428. It is also notable that Idaho Code § 72-429 specifies that the income benefits paid
pursuant to that section shall "likewise" be paid at 55% of the average state weekly wage.
Although the statute is difficult to dissect, we see nothing in the language of Idaho Code
§ 72-429 which is inconsistent with the proposition that it is intended to speak not only to the

payment of what we conventionally think of as unscheduled permanent impairment, but also to
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what we conventionally think of as disability over and above impairment, less than total.
Nowhere else in the statutory scheme does one find direction for the arithmetical calculation of
disability. Only in Idaho Code § 72-429 does there exist the instruction that it be paid as a
percentage of the whole person at 55% of the average state weekly wage.

If Idaho Code

§ 72-429 does not speak to the calculation of disability in excess of impairment, then the
accepted convention for calculating and paying such disability is not to be found in the statutory
scheme.
29.

Finally, although the Supreme Court's treatment of the provisions of Idaho Code

§ 72-429 is scant, we nevertheless believe that the Court's decision in Carey v. Clearwater
County Road Dept, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) necessarily lends some support to the
proposition that Idaho Code § 72-429 provides for the award and calculation of disability over
and above impairment. Carey, of course, is important for articulating the method by which
disability must be apportioned between employer and the ISIF in a case of total and permanent
disability.

It also addresses the question of whether, in discharging its obligation to pay a

proportionate share of claimant's total and permanent disability, employer's responsibility to pay
is subject to the annual escalation provisions of Idaho Code § 72-408. In treating this issue, the
Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the then applicable version of Idaho Code
§ 72-429. The Court determined that the version of Idaho Code § 72-429 then in effect should
not be construed to require defendants to pay their proportionate share of claimants' total and
permanent disability subject to the annual escalator provisions of Idaho Code § 72-408. Implicit
in the Court's treatment of this issue is a recognition that the 90% disability assigned to
employer, inclusive of both impairment and disability in excess of impairment, was undertaken
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-429.

Therefore, although the Court did not
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address the specific issue before the Commission in this case, the court impliedly recognized that
the payment of disability over and above impairment is contemplated by the provisions of the
statute.
30.

While we acknowledge that the former Idaho Code § 72-313 appears to have

treated only what we now describe by convention as the payment of permanent impairment, we
conclude that Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 contemplate the payment of both
impairment and disability in excess of impairment, but less than total. While we concede that
this is a close question, and that the statutes, particularly Idaho Code § 72-429, could be
otherwise construed, we find additional support for the position that we adopt in the axiom that
the workers' compensation laws of this state should be construed in a manner that favors the
payment of compensation. See Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). As
developed below, once it is determined that the unscheduled disabilities less than total addressed
by Idaho Code § 72-429 include disabilities over impairment, it follows that Idaho Code
§ 72-431 does contemplate that disability over and above impairment, but less than total, is

inheritable by the survivors of an injured worker who dies from non-work-related causes.
Therefore, our construction of Idaho Code § 72-429 is consistent with the direction that the
workers' compensation laws should be construed in a manner which favors the payment of
compensation.
31.

As noted above, the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431 have no antecedent in

prior law. A history of the discussions, debates, conferences and legislative action leading to the
comprehensive recodification of the workers' compensation laws in 1971 is sadly incomplete.
However, it is known that model Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (the Model
Code) authored by the Council of State Governments figured in the deliberations of those
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charged with considering how or whether to rework the statutory scheme. 1 Section 15 of the
Model Code contains provisions relating to the payment of income benefits for disability.
Subsection (a) treats the payment of total disability benefits, subsection (b) treats the payment of
partial disability benefits, and subsection (c) treats the payment of scheduled income benefits.
Subsection (c) makes provision for the payment of the kind of scheduled losses found in Idaho
Code§ 72-428. These subsections provide in pertinent part:
Section 15. Income Benefits for Disability. Income benefits for disability shall be
paid to the employee as follows, subject to the maximum and minimum limits
specified in Section 16.
(a) Total Disability:For total disability, 55 per cent of his average weekly wage
during such disability, and 2-1/2 per cent of his average weekly wage for each
dependent, up to a maximum of five (5), specified in subsection (t) of Section 2,
except a wife living apart from her husband for justifiable cause or by reason of
his desertion unless such wife is actually dependent on the employee. (footnote
omitted.)
(b) Partial Disability: For partial disability, 55 per cent of his decrease in wageearning capacity during the continuance thereof, and 2-1/2 per cent of his average
weekly wage for each dependent, up to a maximum of five (5), specified in
subsection (t) of Section 2, except a wife living apart from her husband for
justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion unless such wife is actually
dependent on the employee. (footnote omitted.)
(c) Scheduled Income Benefits: For total permanent bodily loss or losses
herein scheduled, after and in addition to the income benefits payable during the
period of recovery, scheduled income benefits in the amount of 55 per cent of the
average weekly wage as follows: [there follows a list of scheduled indemnity for
loss of body parts] ....
Subsection (h) of Section 15 reads as follows:
When an employee, who has sustained disability compensable under subsection
(c), and who has filed a valid claim in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the
injury before the expiration of the compensable period specified, the income
benefits specified and unpaid at the individual's death, whether or not accrued or
due at his death, shall be paid, under an award made before or after such death, for
the period specified in this subsection, to and for the benefit of the persons within

1

See E.B. Smith, Policy Issues Raised by Proposed Adoption of the Plan of the Model Code as a Pattern for Idaho's
Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Compensation Laws (September 20, 1969) and E.B. Smith,
Comparative Studies of the Model Code with Idaho's Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease
Compensation Laws (date unknown).
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the classes at the time of death and in the proportions and upon the conditions
specified in this subsection and in the order named.
(1) To the widow or wholly actually dependent widower, if there is no child under
the age of 18 or incapable of self-support; or
(2) If there are both such a widow or widower and such a child or children, onehalf to such widow or widower and the other half to such child or children; or
(3) If there is no such widow or widower but such a child or children, then to such
child or children; or
(4) If there is no survivor in the above classes, then the parent or parents wholly or
partly actually dependent for support upon the decedent, or to other wholly or
partly actually dependent relatives listed in Section 17(a)(7) or to both, in such
proportions as the Director may provide by regulation.
Subsection (h) bears striking similarity to the current Idaho Code § 72-431 and makes it very
clear that under the Model Code only the payment of what we would now understand to be
permanent impairment survives the death of the injured worker.
32.

Of course, subsection (h) of the Model Code is not identical to the current Idaho

Code § 72-431. Idaho Code § 72-431 does not address "subsection (G)" of the Model Code.
Rather, it references "scheduled or unscheduled permanent disability less than total". This subtle
difference has significant implications since it leads back to the foundational issue of what is
intended by the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429.

While it is

interesting that the Model Code contemplated only the inheritability of what we conventionally
think of as permanent impairment, the Model Code is not particularly helpful (in fact, it is not
helpful at all) in determining whether disability over and above impairment, but less than total, is
inheritable under Idaho law. To make this determination, we must understand the provisions of
Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429, and as developed above, we conclude that those
statutes treat both the payment of "permanent impairment" and "permanent disability".
Therefore, we conclude that under Idaho Code § 72-431, both permanent impairment and what
we conventionally think of as disability over and above impairment, but less than total, survive
the death of the injured worker from causes other than the work injury.
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33.

It is not lost on us that this interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-431 endorses the

disparate treatment of the survivors of totally and permanently disabled workers and the
survivors of those injured workers who are merely profoundly disabled at the time of death. We
can think of no good reason that is consistent with the underlying principles of workers'
compensation that would support this disparate treatment. We are also cognizant of how our
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-431 incentivizes the survivors of an injured worker to argue
that the injured worker was profoundly, but not totally and permanently, disabled at the time of
his death, when the injured worker, while alive, would be incentivized to argue that he is totally
and permanently disabled.

Similarly, employers are incentivized to argue for total and

permanent disability of the deceased injured worker.

Regardless, and despite the fact that

alternate interpretations of Idaho Code § 72-429 can certainly be entertained, we continue to
adhere to the implicit and explicit direction of Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist, 1988 IIC 0367
(1988). Were we to decide that only "permanent impairment" survives the death of the injured
worker from causes other than the work injury, this would have an impact not only on the
families of such workers, but also on the class of all less than totally disabled workers, dead or
alive. For example, employers entertaining settlement with a less than totally disabled employee
would necessarily enjoy some additional leverage over the injured worker to obtain a more
favorable (to the employer) settlement. The possibility that an injured worker might die from
causes unrelated to the work accident during the period that disability would be paid lowers the
settlement value of the claim for disability. For cases in which an award of less than total
disability has been made by the Commission, sureties might be less willing to pay such awards in
a lump sum for the same reason, at least not without some reduction which recognizes the risk to
the injured worker that he might die before the award can be paid. In other words, the same
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considerations that come into play in a case of total and permanent disability would be engrafted
to all claims for less than total and permanent disability.

II
34.

In Martin, the injured worker died from causes unrelated to the work accident

before evaluation of his disability could be conducted by the Industrial Commission. Construing
Idaho Code § 72-4 31, the Commission concluded that the reference in the statute to "the income
benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's death" did not require that the benefits be
specified by an award made prior to the death of the injured worker. Further, the statute makes it
clear that the benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's death are payable to the injured
worker's survivors "whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death". In this context,
"accrue" means to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim.

"Accrue." Merriam-

Webster Online Dictionary. http://merriarn-webster.com (11 June 2015). Therefore, Claimant's
survivors are entitled to the income benefits specified and unpaid at the time of the injured
worker's death, even though no award had been made and claimant had no legally enforceable
claim at the time he died. Therefore, the statute anticipates that the award defining Claimant's
entitlement to disability benefits may be made after the injured worker's death. Defendants
argue that this construction is at odds with Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333,
870 P.2d 1292 (1994), and Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 (2012).
35.

In Brown, the claimant's medical condition stabilized in 2005, but the hearing did

not occur until 2009.

The Commission awarded disability benefits using the 2005 date of

medical stability. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision. In so doing, the Court
examined the language of Idaho Code § 72-425, noting a permanent disability rating is a measure
of a claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity. The Court found
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"the word 'present' implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability to work as
of the time evidence is received. There is no present opportunity for the Commission to make its
decision apart from the time of hearing." Id. at 609, 581.
36.

Defendants note that Martin, by necessity, contemplates an evidentiary hearing

and findings based on a retrospective application. As such, they argue Martin is at odds with
Davaz and Brown and therefore carries no precedential weight.

37.

In response to this argument, it is first important to note that regardless of what

might have been said in Brown about the preferred point in time for measuring disability, the
specific language of Idaho Code § 72-431 anticipates that the Commission is empowered to
conduct a retrospective evaluation of claimant's disability as though he had he not died from
causes unrelated to the work accident. Necessarily, this involves the assessment of claimant's
disability at a point in time removed from the date of hearing. Neither Brown nor Davaz contain
any language suggesting that a general rule discussed in those cases was intended to impact the
specific language of Idaho Code§ 72-431.
38.

Second, even if it be assumed that Brown has some application to this case, the

Brown Court made it clear that the Commission has the latitude to apply Brown in a way that

avoids injustices or nonsensical results. The specific examples given by the Brown Court were
not all inclusive. Idaho Code § 72-431 recognizes the survival of both impairment and disability
less than total. Were the Commission required to measure the injured worker's disability as of
the date of hearing, no disability would ever be awarded in view of the fact that claimant's death
was unconnected to the work accident and constitutes a superseding intervening cause primarily
responsible for the injured worker's inability to work. This nonsensical result could not have
been contemplated by those who drafted Idaho Code § 72-431. To give meaning to the statute
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requires of the Commission that it evaluate claimant's disability not as of the date of hearing but
as of a date just prior to the death of the injured worker. If applicable to this case, we believe
that Brown affords the Commission sufficient leeway to make this adjustment.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured worker. The
disability of the deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately preceding
decedent's death from causes unrelated to the work accident.
ORDER AND DISSENTING OPINION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured

2.

The disability of the deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately

worker.

preceding decedent's death from causes unrelated to the work accident.
3.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Assistant 'E~mm~SI'<>it 'ecretary
#&$g

s;;

'%%-;-**
~i1,%

()
)}$#

FINDINGS'OP'FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 29

Commissioner Thomas E. Limbaugh dissenting.

1.

For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision

concluding that under Idaho Code § 72-431 both impairment and disability less than total survive
the death of the injured worker from causes other than the work injury. In my opinion, Idaho
Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of Martin v. Nampa Hwy.
Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly.

The very thorough majority opinion

discusses, and dismisses, the important facts of this issue which ultimately persuade me to
conclude that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment.
2.

It is helpful to take a chronological approach to understanding the development of

Idaho Code § 72-431 and its application to the issue of whether disability survives the death of
an injured worker from causes other than the work injury. Prior to 1971, no statute addressed the
inheritability of impairment or disability after a non-industrial death, but the issue was presented
to the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. As discussed in the majority, the case law
regarding this issue, prior to 1971, concludes that in this situation impairment benefits survive
and disability benefits do not. See Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 Idaho 450,254 P. 212
(1927); Mahoney v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927 (1943); Peterson v. JR. Simplot
Co., 83 Idaho 120, 358 P.2d 587 (1961); Martin Estate v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 499 P.2d 569

(1972). These decisions recognize the logic in allowing the inheritance of benefits related to the
loss of function of a body part (impairment) and not allowing the inheritance of benefits for the
loss of earning power or capacity to work (disability). The cases stress that disability is a
replacement for wages, and you do not earn wages after your death.
3.

The next big change in Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law came with the

recodification in 1971. The new law included Idaho Code § 72-431. While there was no prior
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Idaho statute detailing which benefits would be inheritable upon a non-industrial death, the Idaho
Legislature had the prior case law, discussed above, and the Model Code as foundation from
which it created the new laws. The relevant Model Code was published by the Council of State
Governments in 1963 in a booklet titled Program of Suggested State Legislation. The influence
of the Model Code can be seen in many sections of the law, particularly Idaho Code§ 72-431.
4.

The Model Code section which is clearly the base for Idaho Code § 72-431

addressed only the survival of impairment benefits. It is this Commissioner's view that the
Model Code was the substantive base for Idaho Code §72-431, and the Model Code was only
modified to fit Idaho's statute numbering plan which differed greatly from the Model Code's
numbering. Below is the Model Code with deletions and insertions made to generate Idaho Code
§ 72-431 as it was passed in 1971 (the list of inheritable dependents is removed from the end of
the statute for ease of reading).
When an employee, who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or
unscheduled permanent disability less than total under section (c) , and who has
filed a valid claim in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the injury or
occupational disease before the expiration of the compensable period specified,
the income benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's individual's death,
whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death, shall be paid, under an
award made before or after such death, for the period specified in this subsection,
to and for the benefit of the persons within the classes at the time of death and in
the proportions and upon the conditions specified in this subsection and in the
ordered named.
5.

Section (c), stricken above, set forth the schedule of impairment ratings in the

Model Code, just as Idaho Code § 72-4 28 sets forth Idaho's schedule of impairment ratings. The
schedules are simply lists of body parts with a specific number assigned to each body part. Idaho
Code § 72-429 then allows for impairment ratings for other injuries that cannot be classified into
the schedule to be evaluated relative to the schedule, and uses the term unscheduled permanent
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disability to describe those ratings. The language "under section (c)" was stricken and replaced
with the equivalent portion of the Idaho Code, not by section number but by using the terms
scheduled or unscheduled disability less than total.
6.

The Model Code, used extensively in Idaho's 1971 recodification, is nearly the

identical language in Idaho Code § 72-431. It is inherently improbable that the drafters of the
1971 recodification used the Model Code section regarding survival of impairment benefits,
changing only a few words but intending it to result in an entirely different section which applied
to disability instead of impairment. Further, if the intent was to apply to disability it seems that
the new law would also have included a provision for application to impairment.

The

conspicuous absence of the more utilized section regarding inheritability of impairment again
supports the conclusion that Section 431 is that section.
7.

The majority concludes that Idaho Code §§ 72-428 and 429 contemplate the

payment of both impairment and disability in excess of impairment. I do not agree. These
sections help to create the confusion between the use of the terms impairment and disability, but
it is a great leap to say that Section 428 applies to disability, as we currently use the term. Idaho
Code§§ 72-428 and 429 address impairment and, by extension of the same design, Idaho Code§
72-431 addresses only impairment also.
8.

Of course, my reading of Idaho Code § 72-431 requires the understanding that the

distinction between impairment and disability is not consistently applied throughout Title 72. In
fact, the passage of time has modified the use of the term disability.

At the time of the

recodification the term disability was used in a broad fashion which included what we now term
impairment. This is evidenced by a review of the entire Model Code, which uses the terms
disability and income benefits when describing what we now call impairment. In fact, the Model
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Code's definition of "permanent physical impairment" is found in the last section that focuses
solely on payment from a second injury fund for an employee who has preexisting "permanent
physical impairment."

Program of Suggested State Legislation by the Council of State

Governments, p. 164 (1963). The variety of examples set forth in the majority, as well as the
definition discussed above, establish that while the term disability was historically used to
include impairment and disability, we currently make a cleaner distinction between impairment
and disability.
9.

Idaho Code § 72-431 uses the terms scheduled or unscheduled permanent

disability less than total, in the same way that Section 428 details scheduled impairment ratings
and in the same way Section 429 explains the proper evaluation of unscheduled impairment
ratings. Idaho Code § 72-431 applies to scheduled and unscheduled impairment ratings and not
to disability ratings awarded above the amount of impairment.
10.

The final stop on the development of this issue is the Commission's decision in

Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988).

I agree with the majority the Martin

decision is on point and compels the conclusion that disability less than total survives the
claimant's death from other causes.

Yet, for the reasons stated above, I disagree with the

conclusion in Martin and do not support its continued application.
11.

Additionally, I cannot support the effect of the majority's conclusion that

survivors of a claimant with a high disability rating who dies of unrelated causes will inherit the
disability benefits, but the survivor's of a claimant who is totally and permanently disabled will
inherit nothing. This illogical disparity between two classes of survivors cannot be reasonably
explained.
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12.

It is this Commissioner's belief that the statue was never intended to apply to

disability. Martin is incorrect and the legislative history, as well as prior case law, stand for the
proposition that Idaho Code§ 72-431 only applies to impairment. For the foregoing reasons, it is
my opinion that Idaho Code § 72-431 allowing survivability to benefits, in less than total cases,
applies only to impairment benefits. I respectfully dissent from the majority decision.
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NORTHWES T INSURANCE CORP., Surety, by and through their attorney of record, Lea
L. Kear, and respectfully apply to this Commission for an Order granting expedited appeal
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4.

BACKGROU ND
The parties submitted the issue for resolution on a stipulation of facts and briefing.
The matter came under advisement on March 31, 2015.

On July 21, 2015, the

Commission entered its Order in this matter finding that (1) permanent partial disability
less than total survives the death of the injured worker and (2) the disability of the
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BACKGROUND
The parties submitted the issue for resolution on a stipulation of facts and briefing.
The matter came under advisement on March 31, 2015.

On July 21, 2015, the

Commission entered its Order in this matter finding that (1) permanent partial disability
less than total survives the death of the injured worker and (2) the disability of the
1 -MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF APPEALABILITY

deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately preceding decedent's death
from causes unrelated to the work accident. Defendants now request, pursuant to I.AR
12.4, an Order granting expedited appeal.

ARGUMENT
An expedited appeal is appropriate pursuant to the criteria set forth in I.AR.
12.4(a)(1 ). The Commission has entered an Order determining the compensability of this
case with respect to entitlement to PPD benefits. Entitlement to PPD is the onlv issue in
controversy. Allowing Defendants to appeal immediately would prevent needless,
expensive, and protracted litigation because the issue Defendants wish to bring before the
Supreme Court is a question of law which has already been decided by the Commission in
the July 21, 2014 Order. Requiring the parties to develop evidence through hearing would
not change the legal question to be brought before the Court, thus administrative economy
would be achieved through an expedited appeal. Additionally, an immediate appeal would
result in a net reduction of duration, expense, and complexity of litigation if the challenged
order was reversed because the parties would need to spend time and money to develop
evidence and proceed to hearing. Moreover, this case raises a novel and important issue
that will provide helpful guidance to the legal community. Defendants are aware of other
cases in their own office concerning the same issue, and anticipate that the issue has a
broad impact within the Idaho Worker's Compensation legal community.
For the foregoing reasons, an expedited appeal is appropriate under the criteria set
forth in I.AR. 12.4

2-MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF APPEALABILITY

Respectfully submitted.
DATED this _ _ day of July, 2015.
LAW OFFICES OF KENTW. DAY

Lea L. Kear
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of July, 2015, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following at the address indicated:
Michael T. Kessinger
Goicoechea Law Offices
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501
And via fax to 208-743-8140

Lea L. Kear
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chea law Offices Lewiston
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Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140
Attorneys for the Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
KEITH MA YER (DECEASED),
IC No.: 12-004576
Claimant,

vs.

CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF
APPEALABILITY

TPC HOLDINGS, INC.,
Employer,

and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Claimant and responds to Defendants' Motion for Determination of
Appealability, Claimant is not opposed to Defendants' request for expedited appeal pursuant to
LA.R. 12.4.

DATED this ) ~ day of

A'-J1 . . ,. ~

2015.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTlON
FOR DETERMINATION OF APP.'EALABIUTY
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Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP
826 Main Street
PO Box 287
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-2313
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140
Attorneys for the Claimant
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IC No.: 12-004576
Claimant,
vs.

CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF
APPEALABILITY

TPC HOLDINGS, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE,
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Surety,
Defendants.
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COMES NOW the Claimant and responds to Defendants' Motion ~r Determination of
Appealability. Claimant is not opposed to Defendants' request for expedited appeal pursuant to
I.A.R. 12.4.

GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP

Michael Kessinger
Attorney for Claimant
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR DETERMINATION OF APPEALABILITY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
correct copy of Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Determination of Appealability
via facsimile and US Mail upon:
Lea L. Kear, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF KENT W. DAY
PO Box 6358
Boise, Idaho 83707-6358
Fax (800)972-3213

CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR DETERMINATION OF APPEALABILITY

Pg.2

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KEITH MA YER,
Claimant,

IC 2012-004576

V.

TPC HOLDINGS, INC.,

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED
APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4

Employer,
and

F

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

On July 31, 2015, Defendants requested an expedited appeal of the Commission's July
21, 2015 decision in the underlying case pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. Defendants
argue that allowing an appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation,
encourage administrative economy, and resolve a novel and important issue of law. Defendants
represent that they have several pending cases in which the same issue of law is implicated
(inheritability of disability benefits), and anticipate that this issue also has a broad impact on the
workers' compensation community.
On August 5, 2015, Claimant responded that he was not opposed to Defendants' request
for an expedited appeal.

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 1

Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 12.4 allows for expedited appeals in Industrial
Commission Appeals pursuant to Rule 11 (d)(2), given the following considerations:
(1) Whether an immediate appeal may prevent needless, expensive, and
protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the challenged order would
be a basis for reversal upon entry of an order resolving all issues regarding a
claim for benefits.
(2) Whether irreparable harm or loss will result, the possibility of success on
appeal is substantially demonstrated, and administrative economy will be
achieved.
(3) Whether delay would be unduly prejudicial or cause significant material harm
to a party.
(4) Whether an immediate appeal is like to result in a net reduction in duration,
expense and complexity of litigation if the challenged order is reversed.
(5) Whether the order from which appeal is taken raises a novel or important
issue that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community.
In this case, following review of the historic treatment given to the inheritability of
disability benefits, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that the current Idaho Code § 72-431
anticipates that permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the iajured
worker, while total and permanent disability does not.

Commissioner Limbaugh dissented,

arguing that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of

Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly.
The Commission has reviewed the matter, and finds that I.A.R. 12.4(1), (4), and (5) favor
an expedited appeal. The issues on appeal are questions of law, the resolution of which would
prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, and provide clarity to the parties on how to
best prepare their case. The inheritability of disability benefits, including the disparate treatment
of injured workers who are totally and permanently disabled versus profoundly disabled, is a
perplexing issue of some import, the resolution of which will provide helpful guidance to the
workers' compensation legal community.

The Commission agrees that these matters are

deserving of immediate review by the Court.

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 2

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' request for an expedited appeal under I.A.R. 12.4 is
hereby GRANTED.
DATED this _ _ day of---"'=~"""'-':__' 2015.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
of ~~ , 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITEDPPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4 was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
PO BOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
LEAL KEAR
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358

ka

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 4

Lea L. Kear
ISB 9357
LAW OFFICES OF KENTW. DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 895-2580
FAX 800-972-3213
Lea.Kear@LibertyMutual.com
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group
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Attorney for Appellants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Keith Mayer,

)
Claimant/Respondent,
vs.

TPC Holdings, Inc.,
Employer,
And
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.,
Surety,
Defendants/Appellants.

TO:

w
N

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. C. No.: 2012-004576

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, KEITH MAYER (DECEASED) AND HIS
ATIORNEY MICHAEL T. KESSINGER, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, PO BOX
287, LEWISTON, ID 83501 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

Pg. 1 - NOTICE OF APPEAL

1.

The above named appellants TPC Holdings, Inc., and Liberty Northwest Insurance
Corp., appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusion
of Law, and Order and Dissenting Opinion, entered in the above entitled action filed
July 21, 2015, Chairman Baskin presiding.

2.

This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.AR. 12.4. On August 11, 2015, the
Industrial Commission entered an Order Granting Expedited Appeal Under I.AR
12.4, a copy of which is attached to this Notice.

3.

The question to be presented on appeal is whether the Industrial Commission erred
in its determination of what compensation benefits survive the death of an injured
worker.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a) No. There is no reporter's transcript because the hearing was through
stipulated facts.
(b) Not applicable.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the agency's
record in addition to those automatically included:
(a) Stipulated Facts For Hearing filed jointly by the parties;
(b) Copies of all briefs; and
(c) Referee Brian Harper's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and
Recommendation (not adopted) dated April 1, 2015.

7.

Not applicable, no exhibits were admitted.

8.

I certify that:

Pg. 2 - NOTICE OF APPEAL

(a) Not applicable, no transcripts are requested. See 5(a).
(b) Not applicable, no transcripts are requested. See 5(a).
(c) The clerk of the Industrial Commission is being paid a fee for preparation of the
agency's record.
(d) The Appellant's filing fee is being paid herewith.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.
DATED this

'Z-/

day of August.
LAW OFFICE OF KENTW. DAY

/L-Lea L. Kear
Attorney for Appellants

Pg. 3

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Z-l

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the
day of August, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid,
at the address indicated:
Michael T. Kessinger
Goicoechea Law Offices
PO Box287
Lewiston, ID 83501
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S. Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83712

Lea L. Kear

Pg. 4 - NOTICE OF APPEAL

INDUSTRIAL COM.i\-'.IISSION OF

KEITH MA YER,
Claimant,

IC 2012-004576

v.
TPC HOLDINGS, Il'-JC.,

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED
APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4

Employer,
and

F

E

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

On July 31, 2015, Defendants requested an expedited appeal of the Commission's July
21, 2015 decision in the underlying case pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. Defendants
argue that allowing an appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation,
encourage administrative economy, and resolve a novel and important issue of law. Defendants
represent that they have several pending cases in which the same issue of law is implicated
(inheritability of disability benefits), and anticipate that this issue also has a broad impact on the
workers' compensation community.
On August 5, 2015, Claimant responded that he was not opposed to Defendants' request
for an expedited appeal.
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Idaho Appellate Rule (I.AR.) 12.4 allows for expedited appeals in Industrial
Commission Appeals pursuant to Rule 11 (d)(2), given the following considerations:

(I) Whether an immediate appeal may prevent needless, expensive, and
protracted litigation, giving consideratio n to whether the challenged order would
be a basis for reversal upon entry of an order resolving all issues regarding a
claim for benefits.
(2) Whether irreparable harm or loss will result, the possibility of success on
appeal is substantially demonstrated, and administrative economy will be
achieved.
(3) Whether delay would be unduly prejudicial or cause significant materi<J.l harm
to a party.
(4) Whether an immediate appeal is like to result in a net reduction in duration,
expense and complexity of litigation if the challenged order is reversed.
(5) Whether the order from which appeal is taken raises a novel or important
issue that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community.
In this case, following review of the historic treatment given to the inheritabili ty of
disability benefits, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that the current Idaho Code § 72-431
anticipates that permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured
worker, while total and permanent disability does not.

Commissio ner Limbaugh dissented,

arguing that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of

Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly.
The Commissio n has reviewed the matter, and finds that I.AR. 12.4(1), (4), and (5) favor
an expedited appeal. The issues on appeal are questions of law, the resolution of which would
prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, and provide clarity to the parties on how to
best prepare their case. The inheritabiiity of disability benefits, including the disparate treatment
of injured workers who are totally and permanentl y disabled versus profoundly disabled, is a
perplexing issue of some import, the resolution of which will provide helpful guidance to the
workers' compensati on legal community.

The Commission agrees that these matters are

deserving of immediate review by the Court.

ORDER GRANTIN G EXPEDITE D APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 2

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' request for an expedited appeal under I.AR. 12.4 is

DATEDthis {(thdayof

~

,2015.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

//)?;n -d

R.D. Maynard, Chai~

ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 3

SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Jl'~ay of ~ , 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED PPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4 was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
POBOX287
LEWISTON ID 83501
LEAL KEAR
POB0X6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO
KEITH MA YER,
Claimant/Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

V.

TPC HOLDINGS, INC., Employer, and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORP., Surety,
Defendants/Appellants.

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
R.D. Maynard, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2012-004576

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
and Dissenting Opinion, filed July 21, 2015.

Attorney for Appellant:

Lea L. Kear
PO Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

Attorney for Respondents:

Michael T. Kessinger
PO Box 287
Lewiston, ID 83501

Appealed By:

Defendants/Appellants - TPC Holdings, Inc.,
Employer, and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.,
Surety

Appealed Against:

Claimant/Respondent

Notice of Appeal Filed:

August 21, 2015

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR KEITH MAYER- 1

Keith Mayer

Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Name of Reporter:

No hearing was held. The decision was based on a
Stipulation of Facts

Transcript Requested:

No transcript was taken.

Dated:

August 24, 2015

Assistant Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR KEITH MA YER - 2

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, and
Dissenting Opinion; Order Granting Expedited Appeal Under I.A.R. 12.4, and the whole
thereof, in IC case number 2012-004576 for Keith Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., and Liberty
Northwest Insurance Corp.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 24th day of August, 2014.

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL - KEITH MAYER -1

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 43468 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all extra documents offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are
correctly listed in the List of Exhibits. Said documents will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon
settlement of the Agency's Record herein.
DATED this

day of '

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - KEITH MAYER 43468-1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
KEITH MA YER,
Claimant/Respondent,
V.

SUPREME COURT NO.
NOTICE OF COMPLETION

TPC HOLDINGS, INC., Employer, and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORP., Surety,
Defendants/Appellants.

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts;
Lea Kear for the Appellants; and
Michael Kessinger for the Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellants:
LEAL KEAR
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
Attorney for Respondent:
MICHAEL T KESSINGER
PO BOX 287
LEWISTON ID 83501

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - KEITH MA YER 43468 - 1

In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.

Assistant Commission Secretary

NOTICE OF COMPLETION - KEITH MA YER 43468 - 2

